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210 LAmD tI. T. W. MATHER, INC. [51 C.2d 
{L. A. No. 25048. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1958.] 
ELLA S. LAIRD, Respondent, v. T. W. MATHER, INC. 
(a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Duty Towards Business Invitees.-A store owner 
owes to a business invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care 
to· keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition or to give 
warning of latent or concealed dangers of which it knows or 
should know in the exercise of reasonable care. 
[2] Id.-Questions of Law and F&ct-Ordi.na.ry Care.-What con-
stitutes "ordinary care" under the facts is usually a question 
for the jury, which must view the conduct as a whole in the 
light of the circumstances. 
[3] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.-In the 
absence of legislatively or judicially declared standards, 
whether or not the conduct of a party conformed to that of a 
"reasonably prudent man," the standard usually applied, is a 
question left to the jury's determination when different con-
clusions may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
[4] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Defendant: 
Evidence-SuJliciency.-In an action for injuries sustained by 
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom 
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, 
whether defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably 
safe condition was pl'operly left to the jury, and the jury 
could reasonably conclude that by ending a handrail, which 
started at the top of the stairway, short of the bottom step, 
defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger on the 
grounds that it could reasonably have been foreseen that the 
customers, a large number of whom were elderly persons, 
would assume that the handrail would continue the full length 
of the stairway, that their attention would be distracted by the 
display of wares offered for sale in the basement, that they 
would be preoccupied with the possibility of making purchases, 
and that they would rely on the handrail to help them safely 
to the basement. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 108 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 131 et seq. 
McR:. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 76; [2, 3] Negligence, 
§150; [4] Negligence, §§141, 161; [5,6] Negligence, §44; [7] 
Negligence, § 147; [8] Negligence, § 43; [9, 10] Witnesses, § 136; 
[l1J Evidence, §§ 156(3), 156(4); [12] Evidence, § 156(4); [13] 
l~yidence, § 99; [14] Negligence, § 191; [15] Negligence, § 209; 
(16] Negligence, § 246. 
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[6] Id.-OontrlbutolT lfegligence-ExcuReI for Failure to Avoid 
InjulT.-In lin R('lion for injuries sustained by II 7!l-yellr-old 
department store patron who feU on the bottom step of " 
stairway leading to the basement of the store, it does not 
necessarily follow from the fact that plaintiff might have seen 
the last step had she looked that she was contributively negli-
gent as a matter of law; aU of the circumstances must be taken 
into account, and where there is some reasonable excuse for 
failure to observe an obvious danger the conduct may be 
excused. 
[6] Id.-OontributolT Negligence-Excuses for Fallure 1;0 Avoid 
InjUlT.-Although a person may be charged, as a matter of 
law, with knowledge that there are pitfalls to be avoided on n 
public street, it is not necessarily negligent to fail to watch 
for dangers in a business establishment when the ordinarily 
prudent person would not in fact expect the condition where 
it is, or where he is likely to have his attention distracted 
as he approaches it. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-ContributolT Negllgence.-In an action for 
injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron 
who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading to the base-
ment of the store, it could not be said as a matter of law that 
plaintiff did not use the degree of care that should have been 
exercised by a reasonably prudent person under similar cir-
cumstances where the jury eould reasonably conclude that 
plaintiff could safely assume that a handrail, which started at 
the top of the stairway, would not terminate before the bottom 
of the stairway was reached. 
[8] Id.-OontrlbutolT Negligence-Care in DiscovelT and Avoid-
ance of Danger.-Contributory negligence is not imputable to 
a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which he had 
no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who 'Was 
deceived by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily 
prudent person. 
[9] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Matters Bearing on Credibn-
ity.-Although the cross-examination of a witness should ordi-
narily be confined to matters that J1ave been testified to by the 
witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to test 
accuracy or credibility, and -the trial court is given a wide 
discretion in controlling cross-examination affecting the knowl-
edge and credibility of an expert witness. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, §§ 210,220 et seq.; Am.Jur., Neg-
ligence, § 174 et seq. 
[9] See Oal.Jur., Witnesses, § 78; Am.Jur., Witnesses, I§ 625, 
630. 
) 
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[10] Id.-Oro88-uaminatioD-Jrlatters Bearing 011 Oredibllit7.-lu· 
An action for injuries Sl1stftined by A 79-year-old department 
Ktore patron who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading 
to the basement of the store, where defendant's witness 
offered his expert opinion as to the safe eonstruction of the 
stairway "anywhere in the world," the trial court did not err in 
permitting plaintiff to inquire into the basis for this opinion 
or to counter the effect of the witness' broad statement by I 
attempting to show that it was not correct. 
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Accidents or lnjuries.-Before 
evidence of previous injuries may be admitted on the issue 
of whether or not the eondition as it existed was in faet 
dangerous, it must first be shown that the conditions under 
which the alleged previous accident occurred were the same 
or substantially similar to the one in question, but the strict-
ness of this requirement is "much relaxed" when the purpose 
of the offered evidence is to show notice. 
[12] Id.-Relevaney-Other Accidents or lnjuries.-In an &etion 
for injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron 
who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading to the base-
ment of the store, where it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove 
not only that the stairway was dangerous but that defendant 
knew or should have known that it was, testimony of a former 
employee of defendant that he had been informed that someone 
had previously slipped on the stairs and that extensions should 
be installed on a handrail, which started at the top of the 
stairway but stopped short of the bottom step, was relevant 
and admissible, not to show that someone fell, but to show 
defendant's knowledge of the dangerous condition of the 
stairway. (Disapproving Thompson v. Buffum's Inc., 17 Cal. 
App.2d 401, 62 P.2d 171, insofar as inconsistent.) 
[13] Id.-Presumptions.-Disputable presumptions (eontained in 
Code Civ. Proe., § 1963) are evidenee and as such ean be 
weighed. 
[14] Negligence-Instructions-Exercise of Oare-Presumptions.-
Although an instruction on the presumption of due eare may 
properly be given under eertain eircumstances, an instruction 
on the presumption should not be given when the party who 
seeks to invoke it testifies concerning his conduct immediately 
prior to or at the time in question. 
[16] Id. -Instructions - Oontributory Negligence - Exercise of 
Oare-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries sustained by 
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom 
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, where 
plaintiff testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the 
time of her fall, there was no room for any presumption of 
I ) 
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due care, and it was error to instruct the jury on ncb pre-
IIUlIlption. 
[16] Id. - Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructiona-OontributoJ7 
Negligence.-In an action for injuries sustained by a 79-year-
old department store patron who fell on the bottom step of a 
stairway leading to the basement of the store, the giving of an 
erroneous instruction on the presumption of due care, after 
plaintiff testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the 
time of her fall, was prejudicial where from the evidence pre-
sented the jury could reasonably have drawn the inference 
either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, the giving of the instruction added strength to plain-
tiff's contention that she was acting with due care for her own 
safety and thus overemphasized her claim in the minds of the 
jury, and defendant was thereby forced to overcome by a 
preponderance of evidence, Dot only plaintiff's ease that she 
was free from contributory negligence, but also the presump-
tion that she was acting with due care. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying motion for judg-
ment notwithatanding the verdict. John Gee Clark, Judge. 
Reversed. ; 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by patron of 
store as result of fall on bottom step of stairway leading to 
basement of store. Judgment for plaintitl reversed. 
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker 
for Appellant. 
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine and James S. Cline for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-While descending the stairway to the base-
ment of defendant's store, plaintitl, a 79-year-old woman 
whose health and eyesight were good, fell on the bottom step 
and suffered a broken hip. A' photograph of the stairway 
taken from the basement (defendant's Exhibit B, reproduced 
on next page) shows the stairway as it was on the day of 
the accident except that in addition to the handrails there 
was a rail on each side of the stairwell on the wings where 
the brackets appear. The handrail terminated approximately 
a step aud a half short of the full length of the stairway. III 
this action for damages plaintiff testified that she used the 
handrail for support, that when she reached the end of the 
) 
214: L.lm.D fl. T. W. It{ATBEB, INO. [51 C.2d 
handrail she assumed that she had reached the bottom of the 
stairs, and that she then stepped forward and fell. At the 
trial, which was held four years after the accident, she testi-
fied at one time that she could not remember where she was 
looking when she fell and at another time that she was look-
ing out into the lighted basement. Wares were on display in 
the basement in front of the stairs. Plaintiff testified that 
she did not recall looking at any particular display, but de-
fendant's traffic manager testified that after the accident 
Nov. 1958] LAIRD v. T. W. MATHER, INC. 
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plaintiff statecl to him thllt shp hl'l(l hp{,TI lol)king at. the mer-
chandise in front of lhl' stairway. 'rhf're was testimony that 
at least 50 per cent of the customers visiting defendant's 
department store were over 65-70 years of age, that defend-
ant had notice of the condition of the stairway, and that ex-
tensions for the handrail had been ordered but had not been 
installed by the _ time of the accident. Two witnesses testified 
for defendant that the stairway did not violate the Pasadena 
Building Code and that it was constructed according to 
"standard engineering practice." 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for 
$9,540.18. Motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and for a new trial were denied. De-
fendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict 
and from the order denying its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, claiming that the evidence was insuffi-
: cient to establish liability and that certain rulings on 
: admission of evidence and instructions to the jury were preju-
· dicially erroneous. 
I. Sufficiency of the Evidcnce to Support the V udlicf 
[1] It is conceded that the plaintiff was a business invitee 
at the time of the accident. Defendant was therefore obliged 
· to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably 
safe condition or to give warning of latent or concealed 
dangers of which it knew or should have known in the exercise 
· of reasonable care. (Blumberg v. M. ~ T. Inc., 34 Ca1.2d 226, 
229 [209 P.2d 1] ; Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas, 4 Ca1.2d 511, 512 
· [50 P.2d 801] ; see 2 Rest., Torts, § 343.) Defendant contends 
that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
should have been granted on the grounds that the evidence 
discloses as a matter of law that it exercised the required 
degree of care in the maintenance of its premises and that the 
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. 
[2] What constitutes "ordinary care" under the facts 
of any particular case is usually a qnestion for the jury, which 
must view the conduct as a whole in the light of all the cir-
cumstances. [3] Thus, it is common practice for the jury 
to determine the standard of conduct to be applied within 
the compass of the broad rule that the prescribed conduct 
111Ust conform to that of a "reasonably prudent man under 
the circumstances." (See Peri v. Los Angelcs Junction Ry. 
Co., 22 Ca1.2d 111, 120-121 [137 P.2d 441]; Clinkscales v. 
Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72, 75-76 [136 P.2d 777].) In the absence 
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of It>.gifllativeh· or jlldjd811~' dpl'lart>d standards, the question 
whcthl'r or 1I0t t.he 1'0nduC't or a party ('onrormed t.o that of a 
"reasonably prudent mall" is left to the jury's determination 
when different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence. (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Ca1.2d 647, 656 [122 
P.2d 576] ; Brandenburg v. Pacific Gas d- Elec. 00., 28 Cal.2d 
282,285-286 [169 P.2d 909] ; McStay v. Oitizens Nat. T. ~ S. 
Bank, 5 Cal.App.2d 595, 600 [43 P.2d 560].) [4] Applying 
this rule we have concluded that the question whether or not 
defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably safe 
condition was properly left to the jury. Defendant's cus-
tomers included a large number of elderly persons. The jury 
could reasonably conclude that by ending the handrail short 
of the bottom step of the stairway, defendant created an un-
reasonable risk of danger, on the grounds that it could 
reasonably have been foreseen that the customers would as-
o sume that the handrail would continue the full length of the 
stairway, that their attention would be distracted by the 
display of wares offered for sale in the basement, that they 
would be preoccupied with the possibility of making pur- I 
chases,l and that they would rely on the handrail to help 
them safely to the basement. 
Defendant cites several decisions for the proposition that 
it is not liable as a matter of law. In Holmes v. Moesser, 120 
Cal.App.2d 612 [262 P.2d 27], the plaintiff fell on stairs that 
did not have a handrail even though a statute required that 
one be provided. In affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the 
court held that the absence of a handrail is not actionable 
'The trial eourt instructed the jury that: "You may eonaider the 
fact that the attention of persons who visit public ator. ordiJlarily il 
attracted by the diBplay of wares offered for .ale and may be more or 
1e81 absorbed by the tranBaction which they have in mind. You may 
eouider whether the defendant anticipated that fact with ordinary 
eare in the exercise of the duty which I have ddned; also whether the 
plaintiff did or did not ahare that ordinary experienee of .tore visitors, 
and if .0, what effect that fact had upon her conduct in relation to 
the cause of the accident!' Defendant contends that it waa prejudicial 
error to ao instruct the jury, on the 1P'0und that the instruction i. 
unaupported by the evidence. The eontention is without merit. 
Although plaintiff did testify that .he eould not recall that her atten-
tion had boen distracted by any particular diBplay, there was evidence 
that merchandise W&8 on display directly in frout of the stairway; 
plaintiff testified at one time that slle was looking out into the lighted 
basement; and the defendant's traffic manager testified that plaintiff 
told him that just before she fell ahe was "looking at the nlerehandisc 
out in the open in front of the stairwell!' The fact that there was 
merchandise on display in the proximity of the .tairwell is relevant 
to the issue of the foreseeability of accident. from the use of the 
handrail. 
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)l(\gligence when there is no showing that this absence caused 
or contributed to the plaintiff's fall. In the present case there 
is evidence that plaintiff's fall was caused by the fact that the 
railing did not run the full length of the stairway. Marple v. 
Manspeaker, 88 Cal.App. 682 [263 P. 1022]; Harpke v. 
La""kershillt Estate.s, 103 Cal.App.2d 143 [229 P.2d 103] ; and 
Darrach v. Trustees of B. F. County Medical Assn., 121 
Cal.App.2d 3.62 [263 P.2d 469], are likewise not controlling, 
for they hold only that no inference of negligence arises from 
the mere proof of a fall on a stairway. In all these cases the 
plaintiff's fall was left unexplained; there was no evidence 
that the particular stairs were unsafe or dangerous, that the 
defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condi-
tion, or that the plaintiff fell because of any unsafe condition. 
Defendant contends that the condition of the stairway was 
obvious and that it has no duty to warn of dangers that the 
ordinary person would perceive in the exercise of reasonable 
care for his own safety. For this proposition it relies heavily 
on Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas, 4 Ca1.2d 511 {50 P.2d 801]. In 
that case, while walking along a public street with her atten-
tion fixed on a window display, plaintiff fell into a recess from 
which a stairway led to the basement of defendant's store. 
Affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the court held that the 
plaintiff was contributively negligent as a matter of law: 
"The evidence shows without conflict that the plaintiff heed-
lessly walked into an open stairway in broad daylight. She 
was a pedestrian on a busy street, paying no attention what-
ever to where she was walking .... A person walking through 
the busy streets of a large city is charged with the knowledge 
that there are many open stairways leading to basements of 
mercantile establishments. There is no duty to give any 
warning in broad daylight of the presence of a stairway and 
persons must use their eyes to protect themselves from such 
obvious dangers. (Citations.) " (4: Ca1.2d at pp. 512-513.) 
[6] Defendant contends that .in the present case plaintiff 
could likewise have protected· ·herself "merely by using her 
eyes. " But it does not follow from the fact that plaintiff 
might have seen the last step had she looked that she was 
contributively negligent as a matter of law. All of the cir-
cumstances must be taken into account, and where there is 
some reasonable excuse for a failure to observe an obvious 
danger tbe cOlldut't Diay be eXl'llsed. [6] Although a person 
lllay be charged, as a matter of law, with the knowledge that 
there are pitfalls to be avoided on a public street, it is not 
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necessarily negligcnt to fail to watch for dangers in a business 
establishment when the ordinarily prudent person would 110t 
in fact expcct to find the condition wlH're it is, or where he is 
likely to have his attcntion distracted as he approaellCs it. 
(See Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1491-1493; Prosser, 
Torts, 2d ed., 459-460.) There are many cases iuvolviug aeci-
dents in mercantile establishments where the question of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence has been held to be a 
question for the jury even though the plaintiff failed to 
observe what may have been an obvious danger. For example, 
in Walsh v. Maurice Mercantile 00., 20 Cal.App.2d 45 [66 ' 
P.2d 181], the plaintiff tripped and fell over a scale that pro-
truded into the aisle of defendant's store. The court stated: 
"Conceding that if the plaintiff had looked she might have 
seen the scale, nevertheless in the circumstances she was rea-
sonably justified in assuming that the aisle was unobstructed, 
and her failure to sec it was not necessarily negligence. Differ-
ent inferences might be drawn from the evidence ... the ques-' 
tion was one for the jury." (See also Bl1l'1nbcrg v. M. &7 T. 
Inc., 34 Ca1.2d 226 [209 P.2d 1] [clearly visible opening in rug 
mat] ; Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647 [122 P.2d 576] 
[projeetion extending over the end of a stairway] ; Rau v. 
Redwood City Woman's Olub, 111 Cal.App.2d 546 [245 P.2d 
12] [worn and slippery stairs] ; Locke v. Red River Lbr. 00., 
65 Ca1.App.2d 322 [150 P.2d 506] {plainly visible crack in 
concrete floor].) [7] In the ,present case we cannot say 
that as a matter of law plaintiff, did not use the degree of 
care that should have been exercised by a reasonably prudent 
person under similar circumstanecs. The jury could reason-
ably conclude that plaintiff could safely assume that the hand-
rail would not terminate before the bottom of the stairway 
was reached. [8] "Contributory negligence is not imputa-
ble to a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which 
he had no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who 
was deceived by appearanees calculated to deceive an ordinar-
ily prudent person." (Brandenbut'g v. Pacific Gas &7 Elec. 
00.,28 Ca1.2d 282, 287 [169 P.2d 909].) There was therefore 
no error in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 
II. Scope of Oross-Examination of Defendant's 
Expert Witness 
Thomas C. Shields, a cOllstructioll eugiueer ,prest'nted by 
defendant as an expert witness, testified on direct examination 
that in his opinion the stairway conformed to "standard 
) 
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engineering practice" in the eity of Pasadena. On cross-
examination plaintiff's counsel asked whether he limited his 
answers to standard engineering practice in Pasadena, to 
which the witness replied "No," volunteering that: "That 
would also be [true] anywhere in the world, so far as I am 
concerned." The witness was then asked, over objection, 
whether the stairway would conform to proper practice in 
"all of Los Angeles, " to which he replied, "Yes." On further 
cross-examination counsel interrogated him on his familiarity 
with the Los Angeles Building Code and the witness read 
from the code certain provisions dealing with the require-
ment of handrails. Defendant contends that facts concerning 
the building code were irrelevant to the present inquiry, that 
they were not brought out on direct examination, and that it 
was therefore improper to permit this course of cross-exami-
nation. Plaintiff contends that when the witness voluntarily 
stated that in his expert opinion the stairway conformed to 
standard engineering practice "everywhere in the world" in-
cluding Los Angeles, plaintiff could test his credibility by 
showing that this statement could not possibly be true. 
[9] Although the cross-examination of a witness should 
ordinarily be confined to matters that have been testified to by 
the witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to 
test accuracy or credibility (Newman v. Los Angeles Transit 
Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 691 [262 P.2d 95]; Wigmore, 
Evidence, § 1006 j McCormick, Evidence, § 22), and the trial 
court is given a wide discretion in controlling cross-examina-
tion affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert 
witness. (Laguna Salada, etc. School Dist. v. Pacific Develop-
n~ent 00., 119 Cal.App.2d 470 [259 P.2d 498].) [10] In 
the present case defendant's witness offered his expert opinion 
as to the safe construction of the stairway Hanywhere in the 
world." The trial court did not err in permitting the plaintiff 
to inquire into the basis for this opinion nor to counter the 
effect of the witness's broad statement by attempting to show 
that it was not correct. (Of. People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 
469,476 [190 P.2d 9].) 
III. Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Injuries 
Over objection by defendant, George Falk, a former em-
ployee of defendant, was permitted to testify that before the 
aceident he had told Mr. Kalik, defendant's vice-president, 
that: "we should do something ahout that rail because I had 
heard from one of the employees-I don't remember who it 
) 
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;was-that someone bad almost fallen, and he said, • All right. 
Go ahead, and get the extensions put on it.' " The trial court 
instructed the jury that the conversation was received for the 
limited purpose of showing that defendant had notice of the 
condition of the stairway. Defendant claims that the court 
erred, on the ground that there was no preliminary showing 
that the alleged previous incident occurred under substantially 
similar circumstances as the injury in the present case. 
[11] Before evidence of previous injuries may be admitted 
on the issue of whether or not the condition as it existed was 
in fact a dangerous one, it must first be shown that the condi-
tions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred 
were the same or substantially similar to the one in question. 
(MartindaZe v. Afcki.!on, T. cf B.F. By. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 
400, 4:11 [201 P.2d 4:8]; see Wigmore, Evidence § 4:58; 
McCormick, Evidence 351-352. The strictness of this 
requirement of similarity of conditions is "much relaxed," 
however, when the purpose of the offered evidence is to show 
notice, "since all that is required here is that the previous 
injury should be such as to attract the defendant's attention 
to the dangerous situation which resulted in the litigated 
accident." (McOormick, Evidence 352; see also McCormick 
v. Great Western Power Co., 214: Cal. 658, 665-666 [8 P.2d 
14:5, 81 A.L.R. 678] ; (h'Zbert v. Pessin Grocery Co., 132 Cal. 
App.2d 212, 217-221 [282 P.2dl4:8].) [11] In the present 
ease it was incumbent upon plaintiff to prove not only that 
the stairway was dangerous but that the defendant knew or 
abould have known that it was. Kr. Falk's testimony was 
offered solely to show such notice. The import of that testi-
mony was that Mr. Kalik had been informed that someone 
had slipped on the stairs and that extensions should be in-
stalled on the handrail. If believed, the testimony would 
support a finding that defendant was aware that the handrail 
presented a hazard to the users of the stairWay. It was there-
fore relevant and admissible, not to show that someone actually 
fell, but to show defendant's knowledge of the dangerous 
condition of the stairway. Insofar as Tko7'npson v. Buffum'., 
Inc., 17 Cal.App.2d 4:01 [62 P.2d 171], is inconsistent with 
the principle that it is proper to admit evidence of previous 
injuries that reasonably tends to show that the defendant 
knew or should have known of the alleged dangerous condi-
tion that caused the injury in question, it is disapproved.s : 
azn that cale the court upheld a ruUng sustaining the objection to 
couusel's queltions .. to whether or not other women had previousl;r 
Nov.1958]· LAIRD v. T. W. MATHER, INC. 
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IV. Instruction on Presumption 01 Due Care 
221 
Defendant contends that since plaintiff testified fully as 
io her acts and conduct in descending the stairs, the trial 
court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury 
on the presumption of due care. [13] Under the rule ac-
cepted by the majority of this court, the disputable presump-
tions (contained in Code Civ. Proc., § 1963) are evidence and 
as such can be weighed. (Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585, 
590·598 [128 P.2d 16] ; cf. 24 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 211, 219.) 
[14] Although an instruction on the presumption of due 
care may properly be given under certain circumstances (see 
e.g., Westberg v. Willde, 14 Ca1.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590] ; Scott 
v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313] ; Gigliotti v. Nunes, 
45 Ca1.2d 85 [286 P.2d 809]), it is now settled that an instruc-
tion on the presumption should not be given when the party 
who seeks to invoke it testifies concerning his conduct imme-
diately prior to or at the time in question. (Rogers v. Inter-
state Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P. 884] ; Paulsen v. Mc-
Duffie, 4 Ca1.2d 111 [47 P.2d 709] ; Mundy v. Marskall, 8 Cal. 
2d 294 [65 P.2d 65] ; Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585 [128 P.2d 
16] ; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742 [135 
P.2d 578] ; Ringo v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 124 [221 P.2d 
267] ; Jones v. Scurlock, 96 Cal.App.2d 201 [214 P.2d 599] ; 
Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548 [225 
P.2d 997] ; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 
P.2d 850] ; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App. 
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855] ; Stout v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 
127 Cal.App.2d 491 [274 P.2d 194] ; Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 
140 Cal.App.2d 666 [295 P.2d 438] ; Swanson v. Bogatin, 149 
Ca1.App.2d 755 [308 P.2d 918] ; Hughes v. City ct Count" of 
San Francisco, 158 Cal.4pp.2d 419 [822 P.2d 623].) 
[16] In the present case plaintiff testified to her conduct 
immediately prior to or at the time of her fall. "In the face 
of this evidence there was no room for any presumption." 
(Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 86, 88 [297 P. 
884].) It was therefore error to give the instruction. 
fallen on the atairway in question. The court held that the questions 
were properly excluded, on the ground that the inquiry was not limited 
to the particular atep of the atairway where the accident occurred. 
The court did not diBcUIIi the possibility that, if proved, the fact that 
other women had fallen on the Itairway might be relevant to the 
question wbetber tbe defendant was put on notice that Bomething was 
'Wrong and Bhould have inspected the Itairway to discover any defect. 
'rhis evidence could be relevant whether or not the previous falls had 
occurred on the Bame Itep. (See Wigmore, Evidence t 252(4).) 
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[16] The question remains whether the error was prej-
udicial. In .Butigan v. Yellow Oab 00., 49 Ca1.2d 652, 660-
661 [320 P.2d 500], it is stated that: 
"The determination whether, in a specific instance, the 
probable effect of the instruction has been to mislead the jury, 
and whether the error has been prejudicial so as to require 
reversal depends on all the circumstances of the case, includ-
ing the evidence, and the other instructions given. No pre-
cise formula can be drawn." 
In that case, the giving of an instruction on unavoidable 
accident was held to constitute reversible error because it 
tended to overemphasize defendant's case. From the evidence 
presented in the present case the jury could reasonably have 
drawn the inference either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's 
contributory negligence. The giving of the instruction ob-
viously added strength to the plaintiff's contention that she 
was acting with due care for her own safety, and thus over-
emphasized her claim in the minds of the jury. The de. 
fendant was thereby forced to overcome by a preponderance 
of the evidence, not only plaintiff's case that she was free from 
contributory negligence, but also the presumption that she 
was acting with due care. Instructions like the one here in-
volved necessitated reversal in the similar cases of Rozzen v. 
Bl1l'lnenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850] ; Verhaegen 
v. Guy F. Atki,1son 00., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [272 P.2d 855] ; 
and Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. 00., 127 Cal.App.2d 491 
[274 P.2d 194], on the ground that the erroneous instruction 
may. have tipped the scale in plaintiff's favor in the delibera-
tions of the jury. It was therefore prejudicial error to give 
the instruction. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-The question of fact with refer-
ence to the negligence of the defendant and the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff were well within the province of the 
jury to determine in this case. They were both decided in 
favor of the plaintiff. Whether it was error to give an in-
struction based on the presumption provided for in sub-
division 4 of Reetioll 1963 of t.be CudE' of Civil Procl'dure 
allu if so whether it was reversible error uuuer the doctrine 
of Mar Shee v. Maryland Assw'allce Oorp., 190 Cal. 1 [210 
Nov. 1958] LAIRD v. T. W. MAT'nER, INC. 
(51 C.2d 210; 331 P.2d 6171 
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P. 269], were adequately con!'iOl'rl'd b;\, thf' District Court of 
Appeal of the Second Distrid, Divir.ion 1, in an opinion 
written by J usHce Lillic (324 P .2d 301). The presumption 
is "that a person tal.es ordinary care of his own concerns." 
The Mar Shee case places certain limitations, which need 
not here be disCUSSE'd, on the application of that presump-
tion. The District Court of Appeal held that, because of the 
incomplete and uncertain testimony of the 83-year-old plaintiff 
.taken some four years after the accident, the limitations of 
the Mar Shee case did not apply. It was also held that, con-
sidering the evidence and the instructions as a whole, there 
was no reversible error. With this I agree, and adopt the 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal as what I believe to be 
a just and proper disposition of the appeal. I would affirm the 
judgment. 
I 
! CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shenk but 
feel that the problem involved deserves further discussion. 
Even assuming that instructing the jury on the presump-
tion of due care was error in this case, it was clearly not 
prejudicial. 
The challenged instruction reads: "At the outset of this 
trial, each party was entitled to the presumption of law that 
every person takes ordinary care of his own concerns and that 
he obeys the law. These presumptions are a form of prima 
facie evidence and will support findings in accordance there-
with, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. When there 
is other evidence that conflicts with such a presumption, it 
is the jury's duty to weigh that evidence against the preSump-
tion and any evidence that may support the presumption, to 
determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations, 
of course, shall be related to, and in accordance with, my 
instructions on the burden of proof." (Emphasis added.) 
The majority holds that this 'instruction resulted in prej-
udice to defendant on the ground that since the evidence on 
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence is susceptible 
to an inferellce either way, the presumption has the effect of 
"overemphasizing" plaintiff's case in the minds of the jury, 
and thus it might have tipped the ,scales in plaintiff's favor. 
To support its position that overempllasis is a ground for re-
versable error the majority relies on Butiga.n v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 49 Ca1.2d 652 [320 P.2d 500]. It is submitted that this de-
cision will not support this interpretation. 
) 
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In Butigan v. Y tUoW Cab Co., aupra, 49 Cal.2d at 661, it was 
held that an instruction on unavoidable accident in a close ease . 
was prejudicial error, not because defendant's ease was over-
emphasized, but because the instruction was confusing and . 
misled the jury. It is only the probable confusion of the jury 
which was affirmatively demonstrated that justified our re-
versal. Of course, an instruction can overemphasize a party's 
case, but if the jury has been otherwise properly instructed, 
and there is no apparent conflict, then the error appears 
cured. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Shenk, the instructions 
taken as a whole were correct, and since the majority does 
not claim confusion as a basis for reversal, one is ha,rd pressed 
to find any prejudice. 
However, a majority of this court is of the opinion that 
improper "overemphasis" of a ease, without more, is grounds 
for reversal whether or not the instructions are confusing or 
misleading. But even accepting this proposition it can be 
aftirmatively shown that the jury probably did not use the 
presumption of due care to overemphasize plaintUf's ease. 
Thus, a result more favorable to the appealing party would 
not have been reached. Under these circumstances the appli-
cation of the provisions of article VI, section 4%, of the Con-
stitution precludes reversal. (See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 
2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].) 
In establishing that the jury probably was not improperly 
in1luenced one must consider the instruction on burden of 
proof, the application of the presumption of due care to both 
parties, and the findings for the plaintUf on both issues of 
negligence and contributory negligence. Of major signiS.-
cance is this court's conclusion that the state of the evidence 
is in near equilibrium, and that excluding the presumption, 
this evidence is susceptible to inferences either way. Atten-
tion is also directed to what I consider the key factor: The 
finding of the jury that defendant was negligent. 
The burden of proving defendant's negligence was on the 
plaintUf. Defendant, in this situation, had the benefit of the 
presumption of due care. Adopting the majority's reasoning, 
plaintiff was thereby forced to overcome by a preponderance 
of the evidence, not only defendant's ease that it was free 
from negligence, but also the presumption that it was acting 
with due care. However, in the face of the burden of proof 
and the presumption, the jury found on evidence in near 
equilibrium, that defendant was negligent. From this flnding 
it is reasonable to infer that if the jury considered the pre-
.. -......... 
) 
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sumption at all in regard to df'ft'ndant, its effect was negli-
gible compared to the weight the jury gave to the testimonial, 
circumstantial and real evidence. If the jury had viewed the 
presumption as significant, then based on the state of the 
evidence it would have found for defendant. The final in-
ference being that the presumption prohably had no effect 
upon the jury's determination regarding defendant's negli-
gence. 
Since it can be inferred that the jury did not consider the 
presumption of due care in favor of defendant when consider-
ing the question of defendant's negligence, it is unreasonable 
. to assume that the jury acted any differently in its notion 
of the presumption when considering the question of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, where the state of the evidence 
On this issue was, as on the issue of negligence, in near equilib-
rium. One is obliged to conclude, on the assumption that a 
jury will probably act consistently in the same case, that the 
presumption played little or no part in the jury's determina-
tion of plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
Unless this court is prepared to say without any affirmative 
showing, and contrary to reasonable inferences, that the jury 
probably acted inconsistently, it is difficult to perceive, based 
on the evidence herein, precisely how the presumption of due 
care affected the result, so that without the instruction, the 
result would have been altered. Indeed, where the reasonable 
inference is that the jury has given little or no effect to an 
erroneous instruction in considering the question of negli-
gence, and their subsequent determination of the question of 
contributory negligence is consistent with this previous in-
ference, a proper conclusion is that the instruction did not 
result in prejudice. 
It is obvious that as requisites to such a conclusion the re-
viewing court must determine the state of the evidence' on 
the issues of negligence and contributory negligenct', as well 
as ascertain how the jury utilized the presumption in regard 
to defendant's negligence. 
For example, defendant appeals from a judgment for plain-
tiff, contending that it was prejudicial error to instruct the 
jury on the presumption of due care. The reviewing court 
determines that the state of the evidence on the issue of negli-
gence was in near equilibrium but on the issue of contributory 
negligence it was clear and convincing. Examining the jury's 
111 C.2d-l 
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actions the reviewing court Can infer that on the question 
of negligence the jury probabJy disregarded the presumption 
. of due care since on evidence in near equilibrium plaintiff 
had to carry the burden of proof and overcome the presump-
tion in defendant's favor, which worked to defendant's ad-
vantage in this instance. However, on the question of con-
tributory negligence, the jury probably relied on the pre-
sumption in favor of plaintiff since this could form the only 
real basis for a finding for plaintiff in the face of clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. It may be reasonably 
inferred, then, that the jury's actions in handling the pre-
sumption were inconsistent and resulted in prejudice. ' 
Thus, it is the affirmative showing of the jury's inconsist-
ency that establishes prejudice when defendant appeals. 
Without such a showing there is no reason to believe the error 
was probably prejudicial. 
In cases where plaintiff appeals from a judgment for de-
fendant on the ground that prejudicial error resulted from i 
instructing the jury on the presumption of due care, it is 
impossible to tell how the jury utilized the presumption. The 
jury might have found the defendant nonnegligent, or the 
plaintiff contributively negligent. 'Under these conditions 
error is usually found on the ground that the instructions 
tended to confuse or mislead the jury. (See Rozzen v. i 
Blumenfeld, 117 Ca1.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850]; Stout v. ' 
Southern Pacific R. R. 00., 127 Cal.App.2d 491 [274 P.2d 
194].) For this reason the cases cited by the majority for 
the proposition that instructing the jury on the presumption 
of due care constitutes prejudicial error are not in point. In 
Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 285, and Stout 
v. Southern Pacific B. B. 00., supra, 127 Ca1.App.2d 491, 
plaintiff was appealing from a judgment for defendant. The 
jury could have found for defendant on the alternative 
grounds of nonnegligence or plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. Thus, it is impossible to draw any inference from the 
jury's determination of the vital issues since we cannot be 
I'crtain on which ground the jury found for defendant. 
The ease of Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson 00., 126 Cal.App. 
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855], involved au appeal by defendant after 
a judgment for plaintiff. An attack on the instruction con-
taining the presumption of due care was upheld. The case is 
distinguishable on the ground that there, prejudice was predi-
cated, not on the presumption of due care alone, but was the 
net result of a series of erroneous instructions, of which the 
) 
) 
i 
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presumption of due care was only ont'o (Verlta.egen v. Guy P. 
Atkinson Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at 445-447.) 
There are many c·ases holding that the giving of an instruc-
tion on the presumption of due eare in favor of one party and 
not the other, while erroneous, ,,,as not prejudicial. (Rogers 
v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P. 884] ; Pa,ulsen 
V. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111, 119 [4i P.2d 709] ; Tuttle v. Craw-
ford, 8 Cal.2d 126, 133 [63 P.2d 1125] ; Speck v. Sarver, 20 
Ca1.2d 585 [128 P.2d 16]; Scott "\'". Sheedy, 39 Cal.App.2d 
96, 102 [102 P.2d 575J ; see Medeiros v. Soares, 17 Ca1.2d 176, 
179 [61 P.2d 501] ; Stroh v. Ballman, 37 Ca1.App.2d 241, 245 
[99 P.2d 337] ; T1tderios v. Hertz Dril'ut"self Stations, Inc.., 70 
Ca1.App.2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; Mal·tindale v. Atchis01I, 
T. ¢ S. F. Ry. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48J.) 
Generally, it has been held to be prejudicial error for a 
trial court to refuse to give such an instruction in a case 
where, beeause of death or uneonseiousness, the party request-
ing the instruetion was unable to produce evidence as to the 
happening of the accident and the issue of due care was pre-
sented. (Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540 [299 
P. 529] ; Down'ing v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 246 
[59 P.2d 578J; Jones v. Hei1lrich, 49 Cal.App.2d 702, 706 
[122 P.2d 304J ; Maaskant v. Matsltt, 50 Cal.App.2d 819, 823-
825 [123 P.2d 853J ; R11ssell V. AlIclcrscn, 101 Cal.ApI).2d 684, 
697-698 [226 P.2d 350] ; see Ellison v. Lang Transportation 
Co., 12 Ca1.2d 355 [84 P.2d 510] ; Westberg v. Will(le, 14 Cal. 
2d 360 [94 P.2d 590J ; Scott v. BIt,.ke, 39 Ca1.2d 388 [247 P.2d 
313J ; Gigliotti V. NU11es, 45 Ca1.2d 85 [286 P.2d 809] ; Ander-
son v. County of San Joaquin, 110 Cal.App.2d 703, 716 [244 
P.2d 75].) The holding in these cases is understandable when 
we consider the inability of the party involved to produce any 
evidenee whatsoever as to the conduct of the party in whose 
favor the presumption is invoked. This is not such a case. 
As pointed out hereinabove the instruction held by the 
majority here to be prejudic~all~" erroneous made the pre-
sumption of due care equally applicable to both plaintiff and 
delc7ldant. It should be worthy of note that tbis court has 
neyer before l1eld tbe giving of such an instruction to be 
prejudicial error under any circumstances. However, the 
District Courts of Appeal have ruled both ways on the sub-
ject. An instruction on tIle presumption of due care identical 
to the olle ]Iere was given and fonud not to be prejudicial 
error in Medeiros Y. Sa(/rc.~, 17 Cal.App.2d ]7G, ]79 [61 P.2tl 
501J ; Stf'oh v. Ballman, 37 Cal.App.2d 241, 244·245 I99 P.2<l 
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337] ; Ttuleno. v. Hertz DrifJur.elf Station., Inc., 70 Cal.App. 
2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; and MartindtJle v. Atchison T. cfp 
S. F. By. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48], but a 
contrary result was reached in Bozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal. 
App.2d 285, 287-290 [255 P.2d 850]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. 
Atkimon Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442, 444-447 [272 P.2d 855]; 
Stout v: Southern Pacific B. B. Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491, 
496-497 [274 P.2d 194] ; Nun'1lemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal. 
App.2d 666, 676 [295 P.2d 438] ; and Hughes v. City cf7 
County of San Francisco, 158 Cal.App.2d 419, 422-424 [322 i 
P.2d 623] (see Bum. v. Churchill, 152 Cal.App.2d 491, 495-
496 [313 P.2d 575]). 
Originally the rule appeared to be that such an instruction 
was not prejudicial error because in most eases there 'Was 
evidence contrary to the presumption and the courts reasoned 
that the jury 'Would disregard the presumption in the face of 
the contrary evidence. (Medeiro. v. Soare., supra, 17 Cal. 
App.2d at 178-179.) Other eases appear to have discarded 
this rationale and replaced it with the rule that whether such· 
instruction is prejudicial depends upon the facts of the par-
ticular ease. This ad hoc method of deciding prejudice paved 
the way for the theory adopted by the majority here. (See 
Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548, 
553 [225 P.2d 997] ; Bozzen v. Blurnenfeld, supra, 117 Cal. 
App.2d at 288; Stout v. Southern Pacific B. B. Co., supra, 
127 Cal.App.2d at 497-498; Nun'1lemaker v. Headlee, aupra, 
140 Cal.App.2d at 676.) I would disapprove the last cited 
eases and hold the instruction here not prejudicial. 
For the foregoing reasons it seems clear that no prejudice 
resulted to defendant here and the judgment should be af-
firmed. 
